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Highlights

China’s 15-year space development program provides a stable platform to work toward becoming militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and economically as competitive as the United States in space.

China’s development of its commercial space industry can serve to offset government expenditures and its mercantilist trade policies may pose a threat to the U.S. commercial space industry.

While China has numerous bilateral, multilateral and commercial activities with several major economies, U.S.-China coopeartion in space is nonexistent.

Kevin Pollpeter

Senior Research Scientist, CNA

SPARC Brief

China

China's rover on the Moon

Photo credit: “China on the Moon – Congratulations, China!” by MarkGregory007 is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.

January 2021

Overview

One prominent aspect of China’s rise as a world power is its rise as a space power. China’s ambition to become a space power is driven by a belief that space contributes significantly to China’s national power. Its space program is seen as portraying China as a modernizing nation committed to the peaceful uses of space, while at the same time serving its political, economic, and military interests.[1] Space is also seen as contributing to China’s overall influence and helping to maintain China’s national security. China sees its space program as catching up with the U.S. space program and surpassing it by mid-century.

China’s pursuit of space power is intended to support this strategy. China views the development of space power as a necessary move for a country that wants to strengthen its national power. Indeed, China’s goal is to become a space power on par with the United States and to foster a space industry that is the equal of those in the United States, Europe, and Russia.[2] China takes a comprehensive, long-term approach to this goal that emphasizes the accrual of the military, economic, and political benefits space can provide. By placing much of its space program in a 15-year development program and providing ample funding, the Chinese government provides a stable environment in which its space program can prosper. Although China is probably truthful when it says that it is not in a space race, such statements mask the true intent of its space program: to become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and economically as competitive as the United States is in space.

China’s goal is to become a space power on par with the United States and to foster a space industry that is the equal of those in the United States, Europe, and Russia.

Industrial Base

China has made important progress across a broad range of space technologies, including launchers, satellites, lunar exploration, human spaceflight, and counterspace technologies. China now has the second largest number of satellites in orbit and regularly conducts more space launches than the United States and Russia.

China’s space industry is dominated by two large state-owned conglomerates, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). CASC is mainly involved in the development of satellites and launch vehicles and other spacecraft, such as the Tiangong and Tianhe space stations and its lunar rovers. CASIC, on the other hand, is mainly involved in the development of ballistic missiles and, to a lesser extent, space launch vehicles derived from its ballistic missile programs.[3]

China’s space program is also increasingly focused on generating commercial and economic benefits. Since 2014, the Chinese government has placed greater attention on developing China’s commercial space industry. China currently has more than 160 commercial space companies, offering products and services ranging from satellite manufacturing to orbital launch.[4] China currently does not foresee major innovations in space technologies coming from private Chinese companies.[5] Instead, China hopes that in developing its commercial space industry, it can help offset government expenditures and improve the efficiency of the state-owned space sector. In the future, Chinese commercial space companies may be useful in driving down the cost of existing technologies and may provide the Chinese government with more options for acquiring products and services. Some observers in the United States are concerned that China’s nascent commercial space industry may displace the U.S. commercial space industry through mercantilist trade policies.

China currently does not foresee major innovations in space technologies coming from private Chinese companies.

Law & Policy

According to Chinese leader Xi Jinping, China’s space program is “a powerful force for the realization of the rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation.”[6] China has stated that its goal for its space program is to transition from being a “major space power” to a “strong space power” that surpasses the United States as the leading space power by mid-century.

China does not have a single, overarching space law. China releases a space white paper every five years that outlines China’s space policy. According to China’s 2016 space white paper, China’s space program is intended to achieve the following goals:

  • Exploring outer space and enhancing the understanding of the Earth and the cosmos.
  • Promoting the advancement of human civilization and social progress.
  • Promoting economic, scientific, and technological development;
  • Promoting national security and protecting China’s rights and interests[7]
International Engagements

China’s space program is said to be “open, equal, mutually beneficial, and inclusive.” China states that it is committed to space exploration through international cooperation, promoting the governance of outer space, and working to increase the participation of countries, especially developing countries, in space in order to build “a shared future for mankind in space.”[8] The Chinese government states that “all countries in the world have equal rights to peacefully explore, develop and utilize outer space and its celestial bodies, and that all countries’ outer space activities should be beneficial to their economic development and social progress, and to the peace, security, survival and development of mankind.”[9]

China has conducted numerous bilateral, multilateral and commercial cooperative activities with Russia, Brazil, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. US-China cooperation in space is nonexistent. US law prohibits bilateral cooperation between NASA and the Chinese space program as well as the export of technologies for use in China’s space program.

China’s most prominent multilateral cooperative activity is the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). APSCO was established in 2008 and is headquartered in Beijing. It is made up of nine member countries: China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey, and has been granted permanent status at the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The purpose of APSCO is to promote multilateral cooperation in space science, technology, and applications between the member countries.

Much of APSCO’s work appears to focus on training. APSCO also regularly holds international conferences on the application of space technologies in fields such as agriculture and earthquake monitoring. Through ASPCO, China has donated ground systems and remote sensing China will also provide remote sensing data.[10]

Space is characterized as an essential component of modern warfare that plays a role in meeting many of its national security needs.

Trajectories

The Chinese leadership values space power. It better enables China to defend itself, influence international affairs, and develop its economy. It is one element of Xi Jinping’s drive to make China a superpower. China’s space industry plans for China to become the world’s leading space power, surpassing the United States by mid-century.

China’s space program since its inception in the 1950s has been focused on protecting China’s national security. Space is characterized as an essential component of modern warfare that plays a role in meeting many of its national security needs. China’s establishment of a global, 24-hour, all-weather remote sensing system and a global satellite navigation system; an integrated space-ground information network by 2030; and a counterspace architecture designed to threaten an adversary’s space capabilities from the ground to geosynchronous orbit reflect this emphasis on national security.

As China’s space capabilities improve and as China’s space program expands to include more missions beyond low Earth orbit, China’s space program is transitioning to better provide economic and scientific benefits. As a result, economic, commercial, and scientific motivations for China’s space program will figure more prominently, even as national security remains the primary motivation. By 2030, China plans to have a broad range of space capabilities:

  • A complete line of light, medium, and heavy lift launch vehicles using solid and liquid fuel rocket engines, potentially including reuseable launch vehicles
  • A ground-space information network intended to integrate the collection, transmittal, and processing of information derived from global space-based remote sensing, navigation, and communication systems
  • An ability to conduct in-orbit servicing and maintenance of spacecraft
  • A fully functioning long-term crewed space station
  • A robust deep space exploration program consisting of the following:
    • Mars missions, possibly including a Mars sample return mission
    • An asteroid probe
    • A Jupiter probe
    • A counterspace architecture consisting of cyber, electronic warfare, kinetic kill, directed energy, and co-orbital capabilities[11]
Endnotes

[1] Information Office of the State Council, China’s Space Activities in 2011, December 2011, http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-12/29/content_2033200.htm.

[2] Yan Yujie and Wang Hui, “CASC Clarifies Building a Strong Space Power with a Roadmap,” (航天科技集团明确建设航天强国路线图), China Daily, (Zhongguo Ribao Wang), August 30, 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/interface/toutiaonew/53002523/2018-08-30/cd_36846561.html.

[3] China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, “Company Profile,” english.spacechina.com/n16421/n17138/n17229/index.html and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, “Introduction of CASIC,” http://www.casic.com/n189298/n189314/index.html.

[4] China Government Online (中国政府网), “State Council’s Guiding Opinions on Investment and Financing Mechanisms for Innovation in Key Areas to Encourage Social Investment,” (国务院关于创新重点领域投融资机制鼓励社会投资的指导意见), November 26, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-11/26/content_9260.htm.

[5] See, for example, LandSpace (Beijing Lanjian Kongjian Keji Youxian Gongsi; 北京蓝箭空间科技有限公司), “About Us,” (Guanyu Women; 关于我们), accessed March 24, 2018, http://www.landspace.com/w18107.jsp#menu1.

[6] “Building a Strong Space Power, Xi Jinping Full of Enthusiasm,” (建设航天强国，习近平殷殷嘱托), Xinhua, (Xinhua; 新华), April 12, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/xxjxs/2019-04/12/c_1124357478.htm.

[7] The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Space Activities in 2016, 2016, https://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1537024/1537024.htm

[8] “Chinese Space Cooperation: Build a Common Destiny for Humankind – A Presentation by Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Vienna,” (中国的航天合作：构建命运共同体和造福全人类——中国在维也纳联合国举办航天合作主题宣介会), Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Vienna, June 21, 2018, http://www.chinesemission-vienna.at/chn/hyyfy/t1570725.htm.

[9] The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Space Activities in 2016.

[10] Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, “Introduction of the Organization and Its Space Cooperative Activities,” http://swfound.org/media/41415/11.%20pres%20swfcas%20space%20policies%20and%20laws%20-%20xu%20yansong%20-%20apsco%20intro.pdf; and Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, “Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO),” http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/Archive/20th/ARF%20Workshop%20on%20Space%20Security,%20Hoi%20An,%206- 7December2012/Annex%2019%20-%20APSCO.pdf and Wu Minghui, “中国为亚太空间合作组织成员国提供遥感卫星数据”[China Provides Remote Sensing Satellite Data to APSCO Member Countries], ifeng.com, July 6, 2013, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2013_07/06/27207409_0.shtml.

[11] China, The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016-2020); Andrew Jones, “China’s first Mars spacecraft undergoing integration for 2020 launch,” Space News, May 29, 2019, https://spacenews.com/chinas-first-mars-spacecraft-undergoing-integration-for-2020-launch/; China State Council Information Office, China’s Space Activities in 2016; “Bao Weimin: Space Vehicles in Orbit will Drive China’s Space Program to be More Economical,” (包为民：空间飞行器在轨项目将带动中国航天“更经济”) People’s Daily, March 7, 2016, http://lianghui.people.com.cn/2016cppcc/n1/2016/0307/c402615-28179612.html; and “Space White Paper: Our Country Will Build a Space-Earth Integrated Information Network ” (航天白皮书：我国将建设天地一体化信息网络), Xinhua, December 27, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-12/27/content_5153407.htm.

Dr. Kevin Pollpeter is a senior research scientist in the CNA China Studies Division. He is an internationally recognized expert on China’s space program and is widely pubished on Chinese national security issues, focusing on Chinese military modernization, China’s defense industry, and Chinese views on information warfare.

This brief is based on Kevin Pollpeter, Timothy Ditter, Anthony Miller, and Brian Waidelich, “China’s Space Narrative: Examining the Portrayal of the US-China Space Relationship in Chinese Sources and Its Implications for the United States,” China Aerospace Studies Institute and CNA, 2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Conference-2020/CASI%20Conference%20China%20Space%20Narrative.pdf?ver=FGoQ8Wm2DypB4FaZDWuNTQ%3d%3d. 

The views expressed in this SPARC Brief are those of the author, and do not reflect the official policy or position of SPARC or the University of Washington.